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May 2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Disclaimer: Michael Kremer is a PAD Board Member


# New Technological Opportunities

- Optimal agricultural practices may vary with soil type, weather, prices, input and output markets, etc.
- Technological advances facilitate learning about local characteristics.
  - Spectroscopy techniques (mid-infrared light)
  - Satellite or drone photographs (Burke & Lobell 2017)
  - Mobile soil analysis technologies
- Mobile phones enable cheaper delivery of local information, personalization of advice, real-time advice to match local agricultural season, two-way communication, message control.
- Smart phones with capabilities such as video; opportunities for taking pictures and sending them on.
- Behavioral economics and improved understanding of social learning may allow for improved messaging.
- Big Data techniques allow for personalized advice, A/B testing.


What Institutions are Appropriate for Generating and Disseminating Local Agricultural Information?

- Decentralized markets for information are subject to numerous distortions
  - Static efficiency requires pricing at marginal cost, which may be close to zero.
  - Investment incentives limited by marginal cost pricing and/or customers passing on information to other potential customers
  - Information asymmetries may create potential for abusive practices, reduce trust, willingness to pay.
- · Government failures, need for competition
- Global public good issues

# Optimal Practices Heterogeneous Across Farmers



### Soil Characteristics are Spatially Correlated



# Limits to Individual/Social Learning

#### • Individual Learning?

- Soil test/re-test correlation approximately 0.7
- Test plots are noisy. Very few farmers doing test plots.
- Implies information from neighbors is potentially helpful
- Social Learning?
  - Some contexts with social learning (Conley and Udry 2010)
  - But others with limited relevant information exchange among farmers (Duflo, Kremer, Robinson, 2008, 2011)
    - · Little knowledge about neighbors' farming practices
    - No information spillovers of demonstration plots without explicit invitation to observe

# Costs for the Creation and Dissemination of Information

- Fixed costs of collecting and disseminating information, but these are falling due to new technologies, and in some cases have already been incurred
- Social marginal costs of disseminating info by mobile phone in local areas close to zero (unused cell-phone tower capacity)
  - Amazon's web services SMS: \$0.002 in India and \$0.006 in US

- Interactive database and personalization software combined with mobile phones
- · Personalized (or at least localized) recommendations
  - Geographic and temporal info: soil types, weather, altitude, local market conditions
  - Farmer-specific info: demographics, education, cognitive scores, risk aversion, previous farming experience
- Two-way communication and information aggregation
  - Farmers have incentive to contribute accurate information in order to get better recommendation from the system.
  - Information contributed by farmers leads to better recommendations for other farmers.
    - · Example: Fall Army Worm outbreak in Kenya

- Trusted system could be useful platform for providing other info relevant to rural development.
- · System could potentially be useful in aggregation
  - Communicating with purchasers
  - Communicating with input suppliers
  - Quality checks and reviews
- Links to agro-dealers and to extension agents
- Particularly useful in cases in which info varies with physical location, time, and other variables collected by the database
  - Disease outbreaks

- Use of behavioral techniques, social learning ideas to encourage adoption
- Software for personalized recommendations based on sophisticated prediction methods and ongoing A/B trials
  - Test which ag techniques work best for which farmers and how to encourage adoption
  - Outcome data: self-reported, contract farming partner, input coupon system, satellite data?
- Returns to scale
  - Fixed costs of software development
  - Farmer data generation

### **Other Distortions**

- Many potential distortions might prevent optimal investment even with perfect information
  - Credit constraints
  - · Education or other types of human capital
  - Labor supply constraints
  - Time-inconsistent preferences
  - Input supply constraints
- Important to test whether system works, how to target messages, match messages to farmers

# Implication of Economies of Scale

- Dynamic reason for zero, negative price, especially early on
- First movers have an advantage
- May be able to exploit information asymmetries, monopoly position

# Who Could Cover Fixed Costs?

- Private firms with a subscription model, NGOs, governments, contract farming organizations, input sellers
  - Since institutions only captures partial value of info, insufficient investment incentives
  - No financial incentive to share information outside the organization
- Global public good

### **Empirical Evidence on Various Questions**

- Are there some settings in which:
  - (1) There is useful agricultural information that some farmers lack;
  - (2) Farmers respond to information delivered over mobile phones;
  - Farmers provide accurate information that can be used to improve the system;
  - (4) Social benefits exceed costs?

# (1) Is there useful agricultural information?

- In Kenya, perceptions of soil have limited correspondence with actual soil chemistry (Marenya et al. 2008; Berazneva et al. 2016)
- Example:
  - Over 50% of a random sample of farmers in Western Kenya never heard about agricultural lime, despite high levels of acidity and high returns to lime in agricultural trials.

# (2) Can mobile phones be effective as a delivery method?

- Ongoing rigorous experimentation to identify existence of effects and in what circumstances they appear.
  - What works and when?
  - Combine lessons from multiple experiences
- SMS-based lime messaging in Western Kenya:
  - Impact evaluations of several phone-based systems, types of farmers, and types of messages
- Evidence from other contexts:
  - · Hotline and text-messages to sugar cane contract farmers in Kenya
  - Phone-based extension hotline in India

### **Public Extension**

- Partnership with KALRO to evaluate extension approaches
- One treatment arm randomized maize farmers into SMS-based extension (e.g. "If your soil pH is less 5.5, apply lime") or control
- No effect from SMS-extension on redemption of 50% discount vouchers for lime in subsequent season

# Local and General Messages for Lime Use

- Sample of 1,900 smallholder maize farmers recruited through previous projects randomized into local, general messages or control:
  - (i) Text messages with ward-level (local) acidity information
    - "Lime reduces soil acidity.Based on soil tests, apply [quantity] lime"
  - (ii) Text messages with general info about acidity
    - "Lime reduces soil acidity"
- All farmers received a SMS-based coupon redeemable for 10 kg of lime or bar of soap at local shop
- General messages increased likelihood of choosing lime by 4pp (\*)
- No significant effect for local messages

# Local Information to Agrodealer Clients

- Sample of 6,000 farmers who are customers of agro-dealers randomized into three treatments (or control):
  - (i) Text messages
    - "Lime reduces soil acidity.Based on soil tests, apply [quantity] lime"
  - (ii) Text messages + phone call from call center
  - (iii) Text messages + offer access to call center
- Outcome measurement through SMS-based coupons providing 15% discount on lime purchases up to 70 kg at local shop
- Those who are recommended lime increase redemption by 2pp (\*) for text, 4pp (\*\*) for text + offer
- Subset who is not recommended lime decreases redemption by 4pp (\*) for text and text and offer

# SMS on Lime Use for OAF farmers (On et al. 2017)

- Farmers who participate in One Acre Fund (OAF) program
  - OAF offers affiliated farmers ag products for purchase, including lime
- 4,884 farmers randomized into two treatment arms (or control):
  - (i) Broad local message ("Your soil is acidic. Use lime")
  - (ii) Detailed local message ("Your soil is [degree] acidic. Use [Kg] lime at [Ksh]")
- Measure impacts through OAF lime sales
  - Messages increased lime purchases by 4pp 6pp (\*\*\*)

# SMS to Sugarcane Farmers (Casaburi et al. 2015)

- Two trials of text messages to sugar cane farmers with info and reminders.
- One trial found increase yields: 8% ITT, 12% ToT, but no significant gains in the other one.
- · Evidence suggests value of productivity gains exceeds cost
- Positive externalities to other farmers

# (3) Do Farmers Provide Accurate Own Information?

- For system to work farmers need to provide accurate information that could be used to improve services for others.
- Hotline to sugar cane company and query calls reduce late fertilizer delivery by 23% and non-delivery by 54% (Casaburi et al. 2015)
  - Provides proof of concept on using mobile phones to improve supply chains.
- Ongoing experimentation and future work in this area:
  - Allow farmers to ask questions to diagnose problems
  - Nutrient deficiencies by color of leaves, pests, etc.

### (4) Do the social benefits of the system exceed its costs?

- Samuelson (1954) rule for public good provision: does sum of individual valuations exceed cost?
- Approaches to estimating aggregate social value of info
  - (I) Estimates based on estimated impact of providing impact on yields and other outcomes
  - (II) Estimates of behavior change combined with agronomic estimates of the effects of that change

### Phone-based Extension in India (Cole and Fernando 2017)

- Evaluation with 1,200 farmers, offering toll-free access to service farmer hotline: Avaaj Otalo (AO)
  - Ask questions and receive responses from agricultural scientists, local extension workers and other farmers.
  - High take-up: 88% call into AO line
- Impact on farmer behavior
  - Increase in purchases of high quality seed, fertilizer quantity and pesticide for cotton
- · Impact on yields
  - Increases in reported yields in cumin (26%) and cotton (8% for a subsample that received reminders)
  - Calculate 2-year social return at \$200

# **Evidence on Pricing**

- Willingness to pay (WTP) for cellphone extension services in India less than costs
- Average WTP for neighboring soil test information in Kenya more than cost, but some chose placebo information over cash
- Can estimate DWL associated with monopolypricing

### Summary of Evidence

- Taking evidence together, seems like some farmers respond to info, value info in some settings.
- Any one setting could be a fluke.
- Proof of concept, but need to better understand who responds, how to target, behavioral techniques, social learning.

# Precision Agriculture for Development (PAD)

- Non-profit organization to provide locally-specific agricultural information to farmers in developing countries via their mobile phones
- Focus on collaboration with other organizations with wide reach, collaboration on use of behavioral techniques to maximize appropriate adoption, social learning; A/B testing and refinement over time
- Help draw lessons for other organizations delivering agricultural information via mobile phones

# Some Examples of Partnerships

- Ongoing communication with Busia County, KALRO
- Government of Odisha, India
  - Current research collaboration to evaluate pilot mobile-based service with 70,000 rice farmers that complements existing extension efforts
  - Potential for 2 million rice farmers within 2-3 years.
- Government of Punjab, Pakistan
  - Letter of commitment to pilot and evaluate a mobile phone-based service with 20,000 farmers
  - Potential to reach 5 million farmers through government services
- One Acre Fund, East Africa
  - Evaluate SMS system aimed at promoting lime adoption in Western Kenya and Rwanda
- Interested in feedback, collaboration

Thank you!