We present the results of an experiment introducing commercial rainfall index insurance into drought-prone farming cooperatives in Amhara Region, Ethiopia. We provided a market-priced rainfall deficit insurance product through producer cooperatives and tested a number of potential ways to kick start private demand. Take up of the insurance at market prices is very low, between 0.5% and 3% across seasons. When we use a randomized experiment to distribute small free insurance contracts to farmers, 39% of subsidized individuals enroll but this fails to stimulate input use, yields, or income, nor does it enhance demand in subsequent seasons. A training and promotion on the product improves uptake and willingness to pay but also does not improve farming outcomes. We conclude with a case study of our efforts to interlink index insurance with credit for agricultural inputs.

Key words: Ethiopian agriculture, index insurance, randomized experiments.

JEL codes: C93, G22, O13.

Smallholder farmers are beset by an interlocking set of market failures, and when credit and insurance markets are missing, farmers can become trapped in a low-investment equilibrium (Rosenzweig andBinswanger 1993). Production risk likely hampers farmers’ adoption of higher yielding technologies (Dercon 2005), particularly when these shocks are covariate (Townsend 1994; Conning and Udry 2007). Risk-driven reluctance to invest in inputs such as fertilizer and improved seeds may be partially responsible for the fact that Africa has not undergone a “green revolution” (Skees and Collier 2007). This set of insights has raised hopes that weather index insurance (WII) could succeed as a commercial product and provide substantial welfare improvements for risk-exposed populations (Barnett and Mahul 2007). Unfortunately, while several recent studies have shown dramatic effects of index insurance on producer behavior when provided at subsidized prices (e.g. Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013; Elabed and Carter 2014; Karlan et al. 2014; Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2016), weather index insurance has struggled as a commercial product (JPAL 2016; de Janvry et al. 2017) and has seen low demand at market prices (Giné and Yang 2009; Cole et al. 2013).

Even if micro-insurance looks unlikely to enjoy the same immediate commercial success as micro-credit, important questions remain as to how risk protection can best be used to improve welfare. A standard model of the utility benefits of insurance is based on the smoothing of consumption, typically ex post to the shock. A special case for insurance can be made if in addition it has an ex ante effect on the decisions of producers, allowing them to increase productivity as they are protected from risk. To achieve this potential first-order improvement in welfare, farmers must be
directly informed of the protection they will receive, and so marketing insurance directly to individuals appears particularly attractive. Absent this response, integrating index insurance protection into the activities of higher level entities such as banks (Farrin and Miranda 2015; Mishra, Sam, and Miranda 2017) or local governments (De Janvry, Ritchie, and Sadoulet 2016) is likely a more straightforward way to achieve ex post risk coverage. This study is designed to examine whether individually marketed index insurance can create this supply response, experimenting with subsidies and training to examine their effect on demand and agricultural decisions.

Two distinct cases can be made for using subsidies to provide individual insurance at sub-market prices. The first is a business argument: given the unfamiliarity of WII products as well as the demonstrated dynamic impacts of subsidies (Hill, Robles, and Ceballos 2016) and payouts (Cole, Stein, and Tobacman 2014; Stein 2016), temporary subsidies can build a path to a sustainable long-term market (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2016). Second, linkages between credit and risk imply that subsidies provided in the form of risk reduction may have a larger effect than a cost-equivalent lump-sum transfer (Jensen, Barret, and Mude 2014; Karlan et al. 2014). Numerous recent papers have shown that subsidized insurance can indeed induce farmers into growing the higher returning, more weather-exposed crops covered by the insurance (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Cai 2016; Cole, Giné, and Vickery 2017), suggesting that risk poses a first-order drag on agricultural productivity that can be alleviated with subsidized WII. The effects of training on insurance are more inconclusive, with recent experimental studies finding either weak (Cole et al. 2013) or short-term (Hill, Robles, and Ceballos 2016) effects on demand. In this paper we present the results of an experiment that attempts to address these questions by cross-randomizing cost vouchers and an informational promotion of rainfall insurance among cooperativized Ethiopian farmers. We also present a case study of a product that addresses interlinked credit and insurance market failures by offering farmers loans explicitly backed by the insurance policy.

Our study, called EPIICA (Ethiopian Project on Interlinking Insurance with Credit in Agriculture), set out to build a private-sector driven rainfall index insurance product linked with seasonal credit and to field it among drought-exposed farmers in Ethiopia’s Amhara State. We addressed the credibility problem by working with the largest private insurance company (Nyala Insurance) and the largest private lender (Dashen Bank) in the country. Our partners identified market-friendly, drought-exposed villages with potential for increased productivity, and developed a product that uses Ethiopia’s robust agricultural cooperative system to aggregate demand for rainfall insurance. The product was designed to cover the cost of purchased inputs to farming, namely fertilizers and improved seeds. We conducted three consecutive years of stand-alone weather index insurance sales (table A1 in the online supplementary appendix), during which we experimented with vouchers that provided small amounts of free insurance at the farmer level, re-randomizing each year so as to understand the dynamic demand effects of subsidies. A randomized marketing exercise conducted at the time of baseline tests the importance of farmer comprehension of the details of an index insurance product. Four rounds of panel surveys at the household and plot level allow us to analyze the impact of the insurance vouchers on welfare outcomes such as input use, productivity, and income.

Our results paint a mostly negative picture of the prospects for stand-alone index insurance. Despite well-known commercial partners and the selection of high-potential regions of the country, uptake in the absence of subsidies was very low, between 0.5% and 3% of cooperative membership at commercial prices (~130% of actuarially fair). The subsidies for insurance uptake had a very strong effect on coverage rates (~40% of those offered vouchers registered to be insured); yet, similar to Takahashi et al. (2016) we find that subsidies have no dynamic effect on private demand. Where our results differ from prior studies such as Karlan et al. (2014) is that we then find no downstream effect of subsidized risk protection on agricultural practices or income. More promisingly, we do find that the simple and inexpensive insurance promotion we conducted at baseline had a lasting effect on demand and is the only intervention we tested that led to meaningful willingness to invest one’s own money in premium purchases.

Relative to the literature, the surprising result from our study is the lack of impacts on producer behavior even when the insurance
is provided for free. We explore four dimensions that might explain this unresponsiveness. First, we provided only relatively small insurance subsidies to farmers (average premium voucher value of $20, maximum payout implied of $80). We have an almost perfect ability to predict the sum insured with the voucher amount, and even when we examine the slope effect or the impact at high voucher amounts, there is no indication of an input use response. Second, we examine whether we have a strong effect restricted to the subpopulation of individuals risk rationed at baseline. Although these individuals are more likely to take up insurance when offered a voucher and invest less overall in inputs, there is no differential impact of the treatment on the risk rationed. Third, could the indirect marketing strategy pursued by the insurer to lower administrative costs and improve commercially viability be responsible? We use a survey of comprehension in the fourth round to examine this and find that although a very high fraction of the treatment sample knew of and had considered the product, detailed understanding of the contract was lacking and very few had direct contact with the insurer. Finally, we discuss contextual features that may have caused the product to struggle in Ethiopia in particular but find no heterogeneity in uptake based on cooperative membership or exposure to the main government safety net program. Overall, our study shows that the psychology of protection from risk among smallholder producers is not easily created. Despite the backing of a well-known national brand, near universal awareness of the program, and excellent understanding of the subsidies, input investment behavior did not change in a first-order sense. Our analysis of channels leaves the poor comprehension of the details of the insurance and the indirect relationship with the insurer as prime suspects. Even the fact that our training had strongly significant effects on uptake of the insurance reinforces the critical role of familiarity. In light of these results it appears that serious investment is required to create the ex ante response to risk protection, and absent this it may make more sense to focus attention on meso-level entities who can provide ex post risk protection with smaller transactions costs.

In the final section of the paper we provide a case study of the one cooperative in which we were able to successfully field the interlinked insurance-backed credit product. Our intended study design added to the stand-alone WII insurance an “interlinked” product that offered agricultural loans on the condition that the farmer would purchase rainfall insurance to cover the loan. This has the potential to unlock substantial credit demand by reducing risk-related obstacles to investment. Theoretically, Carter, Cheng, and Sarris (2016) showed that when covariate risk is a large share of total risk faced by farmers, and when there is lack of credit, such a product would be demanded by small farmers and would increase input use and output. However, several other recent studies found that bundling insurance with a credit contract actually decreased demand for fertilizer relative to a stand-alone credit product (Giné and Yang 2009; Banerjee, Duflo, and Hornbeck 2014). The most likely explanation for these results seems to be that farmers were interested mostly in credit, and anything that increased, albeit in the short-term, its cost (such as insurance premiums) would lower credit demand and the linked insurance. In the end, the interlinked product proved a substantial challenge to field for reasons that speak to the core issue of the reassignment of agricultural risk within the credit system. Nonetheless, where we were successful in fielding this product, a substantial improvement in credit access and input use appears to have resulted.

The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the setting, research design and data collection strategy for the study, as well as the construction of the index and basic statistics on demand. Section 3 analyzes the impact of insurance vouchers on farmer behavior, section 4 investigates four reasons for the low impact of our intervention, and section 5 presents the case study of the cooperative where we fielded the interlinked product. Section 6 concludes.

**Study Context**

*Inputs and Credit in Ethiopian Smallholder Agriculture*

Given the transformative effect of agricultural technology on yields, risk-driven barriers to adoption present an obvious potential poverty trap (Christiaensen and Demery 2007) and hold out the possibility that risk-protecting products such as index insurance may not only provide second-order benefits through variance reduction but first-order benefits through
enhanced willingness to take profitable risks among producers. Despite large secular increases in fertilizer use and household income over time, overall input use and productivity remain low.\(^1\) Per hectare fertilizer consumption is less than one fifth of that of other developing countries (Morris et al. 2007). Dercon and Hill (2009) report that fertilizer intensity per hectare of fertilized area has not increased between 1997/98 and 2007/08, despite the apparent doubling of total fertilizer sales during the same period. This can be largely explained by a heavy reliance on extensi

The absence of productive credit may be an important reason for the low use of improved inputs and hence lower productivity among African rural smallholders. Many studies have found that small farmers in developing countries are credit constrained and as a consequence use few purchased inputs (Besley 1995; Conning and Udry 2007).\(^2\) The system of input distribution and financing in Ethiopia has evolved over time but consistently features a dominant role for state-led actors. Although thriving private output markets exist, the government is responsible for fertilizer imports, and the cooperative sector is used as the primary delivery vehicle for most improved inputs. In Amhara region, the Cooperative Unions handle the wholesale demand aggregation function, pre-ordering inputs through a public enterprise (AISE), and also serving as a conduit to financing through the publicly owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Our fieldwork found that the financing chain in recent years has been subject to a game of chicken, whereby the government announces early in the season that fertilizer would be distributed on a cash-only basis, but once it becomes clear that this would result in low demand and excess stocks of fertilizer, they injected public-sector credit later in the season. Regional governments are required to underwrite the risks of smallholder input financing and have been eager to find ways of shedding this risk, as any farmer arrears have to be paid by the state budget. Cooperatives, local government agents, and local agricultural extension workers have been pressed into service to assist with the collection of the debts used to finance inputs, so individual borrowers take on substantial risk when they finance inputs obtained through the cooperatives.

The Ethiopian context, then, is an ideal one in which to pilot index insurance from the perspective of exposure to risk, and several recent studies have been conducted in the country (e.g. Hill and Viceiszta 2010; Berhane et al. 2014; Dercon et al. 2014; and Oxfam’s HAR-ITA project described in OXFAM 2014). However, from the institutional perspective Ethiopia is a challenging environment in which to introduce a novel and complex private-sector financial service. Rigidity of input supply chains, strong government-led approach to both credit and fertilizers, and the presence of the massive Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)\(^3\) in Amhara Region all reinforce the central role that the government plays in agriculture and risk management. The high climate variability and its central role in driving risks in Ethiopian agriculture makes reinsurers reluctant to provide coverage and increases the price of reinsurance. All of this implies that the public sector plays a driving role in absorbing agricultural risk, and although these entities may be eager to spread these risks more broadly it is likely to be a challenging context in which to engineer private-sector institutional means to do so.

**Index Design**

We now describe the insurance product in more detail. The starting point was the powerful village-level cooperative system, through which most inputs in the Ethiopian smallholder supply chain move. Recognizing the importance of local networks as means for spreading information (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2015) and sharing the remaining risks in the face of an imperfect index (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013; de Janvry, 2007).

\(^1\) A host of demand and supply side factors have been invoked to explain the limited adoption of fertilizer in Ethiopia including limited knowledge and education (Asfaw and Admasie 2004; Yu et al. 2011), risk preferences, credit constraints (Croppenstedt, Demeke, and Meschi 2003), irregular rainfall (Alem et al. 2008), limited profitability of fertilizer use (Dadi, Burton, and Ozanne 2004), lack of market access (Abrar, Morrissey, and Rayner 2004), incomplete markets (Zerfu and Larson 2010), inefficiency of input use (Yu et al. 2011), as well as limited or untimely availability of the inputs themselves.

\(^2\) Other recent analyses, however, emphasize the poor quality of soils that make adoption unprofitable (Marenya and Barrett 2009) or the heterogeneity of farmer profitability of fertilizer use (Suri 2011).

\(^3\) Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is a national program, started in 2005, that helps vulnerable families to ensure minimum nutrition.
The identification of the original 120 study villages (kebeles) in Amhara region was conducted by Nyala Insurance, who selected regions that were generally drought exposed, within 20 km of a rainfall station, and that they believed to be good markets for weather insurance with well-functioning village cooperatives (see online supplementary appendix, figures A2A and A2B for maps of the study area). The selection of the Kebeles was purposive and designed on the basis of informed demand.

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Dequeidt, and Sadoulet 2014; Dercon et al. 2014), the cooperatives provide a potentially promising avenue through which to offer index insurance products. Given the potential trust problems with asking cooperatives to smooth risk (McIntosh et al. 2019) and the importance of making sure that the input decision maker is directly aware of risk protection, we elected to market the product through the cooperative network but to designate specific individual buyers as the explicit beneficiaries of the insurance policies. The focus of the project was to improve input use, and therefore, the insurance product was conceptualized as insuring the value of purchased inputs rather than trying to cover the variation in the value of output. The input purchases of an average-sized farm in Amhara operating at the input intensity recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture would be roughly 4,000 birr ($278).

The first sales year (summer of 2012) was characterized by a widespread drought, and the insurance triggered in 42% of the study villages for at least one crop. The average payout in the first year was $27, the minimum $3 and the maximum $121; payout rates ranged from 3% to 75% of the sum insured. In the second sales year (summer 2013) the index triggered for only 13% of villages in at least one crop, with smaller payouts averaging $9. Given an average input expenditure of $172 on average across all inputs, the observed payouts based on the voucher experiment cover just under 20% of the value of inputs.

How well does the index correlate with our survey-measured agricultural yields? To examine this question we take the primary yield outcome (a normalized index of yields across all crops grown by a farmer) and examine the variation in this variable across villages and across years.4 We present two ways of thinking about the quality of the index. First, in online supplementary appendix, table A2, we show a simple two-by-two table of the village/years in which the index would have paid out versus whether our survey-based measure of yields indicates a shock occurred (as measured by normalized yield outcomes that are in the bottom 20% of the distribution). This shows that of the 79 village/years in which the survey indicates no yield shock, we have index payouts (false positives) in 21% of them. For the 19 village/years in which the survey does indicate a yield shock, the index pays out just over half of the time.

Second, online supplementary appendix, figure A1 plots the Cumulative Density Function of normalized yields for village/years in which the index did and did not pay out. In the left-hand figure we perform a placebo test by analyzing survey-based yields in the year before insurance sales started as a function of whether there would be payouts in the future. Here we should see the distributions of yields very similar, and indeed we do. In the right-hand panel we then plot the same distributions for the subsequent year in which the index does pay out. In this year, the distribution of yields in villages where the index does not pay out first-order stochastic dominates the distribution where it does, and there is a particularly pronounced mass of farmers with yields far below average where payouts occur. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows the CDFs in the right-hand panel to be significantly different at the 99% level. This pair of graphics illustrates that payouts and yields are strongly contemporaneously negatively correlated and do not appear to suffer from any spurious correlation. Overall, although our index was meaningfully correlated with yields a substantial amount of basis risk remains, and given the insights presented in de Nicola (2015) and Carter, Cheng, and Sarris (2016) this may be an important explanation for low overall demand.

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4The yield index includes the five main crops grown and insured in Amhara: teff, maize, wheat, barley, and sorghum. For each crop we calculate a mean and standard deviations of yields per hectare based on the control group distributions in the pre-treatment rounds. We then Z-score the yields for each crop by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation for each crop, and take the average value of this normalized metric for all farmers who grow the crop in that village/year. This measures how many standard deviations from the average yield per hectare are farmers across all crops in a village/year.

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opinion of Nyala as to where in the Amhara region the market for WII has best potential.\(^5\)

Within study villages we then randomly sampled eighteen households from within the membership of the village agricultural cooperative, and two households from the non-cooperative farming population of the village.\(^6\)

Online supplementary appendix, table A3 provides summary statistics by region from the baseline, underlining the extremely low education levels among household heads prevalent in our sample.\(^7\) We conducted a second, shorter baseline survey in 2012 collecting the primary agricultural outcomes only so as to provide a more powerful estimate of pre-treatment outcomes, as advocated in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). The baseline data were used to conduct a village-level randomization stratified on average fertilizer use and blocked on region, which assigned villages into three arms of forty villages each: stand-alone villages in which only WII was offered, interlinked villages that offered both stand-alone WII and insured loans, and a control. In both types of treatment villages we conducted household-randomized experiments giving vouchers for small amounts of free insurance coverage, and insurance training.

Unfortunately, several implementation problems altered the intended design. First, the reinsurer proved unwilling to underwrite the product in a subset of weather stations that had fewer than thirty years of valid data. Second, with detailed survey data in hand we realized that some of the study villages were more exposed to other weather risks (frost, hail, flooding) than drought. Taking the entire study sample that reported being drought exposed in the baseline survey as well as being within twenty kilometers of one of the nine reinsurable weather stations, the reduction of the eligible weather stations left us with a sample of only forty-nine villages in which we could reasonably field the insurance product. Third, delays in the implementation of the credit side meant that it was only possible to offer the interlinked product after the experimental phase of the project had ended (see Section 6 for a non-experimental description of our interlinked treatment), and so all insurance studied in the main tables for the paper is stand alone. The effective research design for the village-level experiment therefore compares the thirty-four villages in which stand-alone insurance was offered to the fifteen experimental control villages in which it was not. Figure 1 indicates the original and eventual study sample.

Fortunately, the experiment also features two dimensions that were randomized at the household level. These individual experiments provide us with a source of variation, which is still experimental (being blocked by village or subsequent to attrition) and relatively high-powered statistically. First, at the time of the baseline survey we selected a random subset of cooperative farmers to receive a promotion and training in the way that the index works. Because we were concerned that the indirect marketing techniques used by Nyala might generate only an imperfect understanding of the product (they trained village level agricultural extension officials to work with village cooperative leaders to promote the product to farmers), we employed the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) to conduct these randomized promotions as a part of the baseline activity. EEA was hired using research funds to give an extended promotion of the product, including conducting a fifteen-minute presentation of the details of the product for a randomly selected six households per kebele, discussing and answering any questions the household had about the way the product works, and leaving behind a flyer indicating how Nyala would use rainfall at the nearest station to determine payouts and which historical years the product would have paid out in that village.

Secondly, in all years where rainfall insurance was offered, a random subset of households in treatment villages received vouchers that they could use to obtain some insurance coverage for free. The size of the free insurance voucher was designed to be 10, 30, and 50% of the amount of insurance premium that the farmer would need to cover inputs for the average sized farm (calculated as a function of average land size and the recommended input usage in Amhara). Each type of voucher was offered to five farmers in each kebele. Given thirty-four treatment kebeles, a total

\(^5\) The selected zones in Amhara are North Shewa, West Gojam, South Wello, and North Wello.

\(^6\) Because fertilizers are procured exclusively through primary cooperatives and their upper level zonal cooperative unions (CUs) in Ethiopia, it was anticipated that cooperative households may display a higher propensity to uptake additional fertilizer if risk concerns can be ameliorated. We focus the analysis in this paper on the cooperative membership only.

\(^7\) From online supplementary appendix, table A3 it can be seen that 51% of household heads have no education, only 21.5% received any formal education, among whom the average years of schooling is 4.8 years. A full 56.5 percent of household heads cannot read or write.
of 170 farmers received each type of voucher for a total of 510 farmers out of the 680 farmers surveyed in the treatment kebeles. In sales season 2, vouchers were re-randomized at the household level. Finally in early 2016 a small group of 120 households in the only kebele which successfully fielded the interlinked credit-insurance product were surveyed. Table 1 presents the final design of the household-randomized component of the study in the forty-nine villages that were panel tracked as a part of the survey. Online supplementary appendix, table A4 shows how core study outcomes evolved across time; despite impressive overall improvements in input use the study sample has very high levels of food insecurity and farm size fragmentation is occurring quickly.

### Attrition and Balance

As described above, the study is subject to two kinds of attrition. The first is at the village level, where we lost locations to the study due to (a) lack of exposure to drought and (b) rainfall stations that were not reinsurable. We lost almost 60% of our sample due to these sources of village-level attrition. Within the panel sample of villages, we then attempted to track all study households in these villages and achieved a four-round tracking rate of 92.5%. Tracking this sample of twenty households each in forty-nine villages, we conducted two post-treatment household and cooperative-level surveys, one in 2014 and one in 2015. Table A5 analyzes the extent to which the two types of attrition from the study are correlated with treatment status. First, in columns 1 and 2 we examine whether the rate of attrition is differential across village-level treatment status and find that both the original stand alone and interlinked arms were lost to the study at rates from 7.5 to 12% points lower than the control. These differences are not significant. Given the high and potentially differential attrition subsequent to randomization, this village-level component (whether insurance offered) cannot be considered cleanly experimental.

Despite the village level attrition the farmer-level randomization should still be clean because the training was blocked by village, and vouchers were blocked and randomized subsequent to village-level attrition. In the online supplementary appendix, columns (3) and (4) of table A5 show that household-level attrition is low overall (9% in the control) and not significantly different across those who receive the voucher or training treatments. Online supplementary appendix, table A6 examines the balance of the un-attrited sample.

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**Figure 1. Consort diagram of study recruitment and attrition**

![ Consort diagram of study recruitment and attrition ](chart.png)
on baseline covariates (panel A) and baseline outcomes (panel B), and finds the panel experimental sample to be well balanced overall (only five comparisons out of eighty significant at 5% level). Based on this analysis of attrition and balance, we place the emphasis of our analysis on the individually randomized treatments.

**Analysis of Uptake of Insurance**

As presented in McIntosh, Sarris, and Papado- poulos (2013), we conducted a stated willingness to pay study at baseline, which indicated that almost 50% of the study sample would be willing to purchase stand-alone index insurance at actuarially fair prices. Table 2 illustrates that this stated WTP radically overestimated the actual demand for the product. The table shows simple summary statistics of the rate of take up and the average sum insured across the various years and arms of the study. The study featured only one-sided non-compliance, meaning that there were no individuals who received insurance in the control villages at any point in the study. Distressingly, there were no surveyed households who ever purchased insurance in the absence of any voucher is roughly .5%. This makes it clear that the insurance, as priced to reflect all costs and as promoted through the indirect marketing strategies used by Nyala, was simply not viable as a commercial product. The average premium paid toward insurance in treatment villages during the first sales season without the training was $3.77, and the training added another $3.75 on to this figure (table 2, third row). However, roughly 95% of this value came from the vouchers rather than from true willingness to pay in farmers’ own money, and so what we study here is almost exclusively the decision to accept free insurance and the impact of receiving it. In the second sales season, both willingness to accept the vouchers and the amount paid from farmers’ own pockets rose, but because the voucher amounts were smaller, the overall sum insured fell. Consequently, as shown in the online supplementary appendix, figure A3 the average sum insured at the individual level is an almost linear function of the voucher amount, a feature we exploit in Section 4.2. The sum insured was slightly higher in the first sales season than the second because the voucher amounts were larger. Non-cooperative members take up stand-alone insurance at about two-thirds the rate of coop members.

The more optimistic perspective on table 2 is that the two individually randomized components of our insurance promotion had very strong effects on the probability that a farmer is actually covered by the insurance. In both seasons the vouchers have an effect significant

### Table 1. Promotion and Voucher Experiment in the Panel Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control (15 villages)</th>
<th>Standalone arm (17 villages)</th>
<th>Interlinked arm (17 villages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial # cooperative households:</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First sales season (outcomes in R3 survey)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households remaining in panel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided training &amp; promotion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided voucher:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 birr ($6.94)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 birr ($13.89)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 birr ($20.83)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 birr ($27.78)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 birr ($34.72)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second sales season (outcomes in R4 survey)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households remaining in panel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided voucher:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 birr ($6.94)</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 birr ($13.89)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 birr ($20.83)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
well above the 99% level on insurance uptake. The EEA-administered training and promotion is also independently effective; conditional on already having received a voucher, also receiving the training has an effect on uptake in the first sales season and roughly doubles the premiums paid by farmers. In the second sales year, the additional effect of the training had faded, but trained farmers were putting $1.46 more of their own money into premiums, significant at the 10% level. Hence, although our study suffered from multiple forms of attrition at the village level and did not generate mass-scale uptake, we have delivered a statistically relatively well-powered experiment in what happens to farm outcomes when farmers are covered by WII. We now proceed to analyze the impact of these individually randomized components on farm-level outcomes.

**Impact Analysis**

*Intention to Treat Effect of Free Insurance Vouchers*

We can use the experiment to track out the impact of being insured on the primary objective outcomes of the study: use of fertilizer, use of improved seeds and credit, agricultural yields, and household income. The best powered regression specification is the standard panel fixed effects difference in differences (DID), namely:

\[
Y_{ict} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta_1 T_{ct} + \beta_2 V_{ict} + \epsilon_{ict}
\]

Here \(\alpha_i\) is an individual fixed effect; \(\delta_t\) is a fixed effect for each of the post-treatment survey waves; \(T_{ct}\) is a panel treatment dummy that switches on in treatment villages for rounds 3 and 4 (pooling together the standalone and interlinked arms because only stand-alone insurance was sold); and \(V_{ict}\) is a panel dummy variable indicating that the individual was treated in that season (received the voucher, the training, or both, in subsequent tables). We cluster standard errors at the village level to account the village-level design effect. Given this specification, \(\beta_1\) is the impact of being in a treated village and not receiving a voucher, and \(\beta_2\) is the ITT impact of receiving a voucher. Based on the uptake analysis, we expect \(\beta_1\) to be zero, and we are primarily interested in the sign and magnitudes of \(\beta_2\).

Table 3 presents the analysis of the insurance vouchers. We begin in columns 1 and 2 with the analysis of uptake, presenting a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 1:</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Uptake rate: N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Round 2:</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Uptake rate: N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 3:</th>
<th>Control villages</th>
<th>No voucher, treatment villages:</th>
<th>Voucher only</th>
<th>Difference from control</th>
<th>Voucher + EEA Promotion</th>
<th>Difference from voucher only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uptake rate:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>0.275***</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>0.0947**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average premium payment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$3.77</td>
<td>3.772***</td>
<td>$7.52</td>
<td>3.752***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average own money spent:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$0.20</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>$0.45</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average sum insured:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$25.10</td>
<td>25.10***</td>
<td>$43.15</td>
<td>18.06***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 4:</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Uptake rate: N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average premium payment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average own money spent:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average sum insured:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(* = 99%.
\** = 95%.
\* = 90%.

Table 2. Insurance Uptake
### Table 3. Panel DID Impact of the Voucher Experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covered by insurance</th>
<th>Sum insured</th>
<th>Any chemical fertilizer</th>
<th>KGs of chemical fertilizer</th>
<th>Number of crops using chemical fertilizer</th>
<th>Uses any improved seeds</th>
<th>Uses any input credit</th>
<th>Total value of inputs used</th>
<th>Index of agricultural yields</th>
<th>HH income per capita</th>
<th>Area cultivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any voucher</strong></td>
<td>0.356***</td>
<td>39.23***</td>
<td>0.0309</td>
<td>-4.639</td>
<td>-0.0604</td>
<td>0.0779*</td>
<td>-0.0171</td>
<td>-14.33</td>
<td>-0.0207</td>
<td>78.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0498)</td>
<td>(7.761)</td>
<td>(0.0419)</td>
<td>(6.218)</td>
<td>(0.0903)</td>
<td>(0.0404)</td>
<td>(0.0436)</td>
<td>(19.19)</td>
<td>(0.0481)</td>
<td>(66.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated village</strong></td>
<td>0.00228</td>
<td>-1.023</td>
<td>-0.0448</td>
<td>2.550</td>
<td>-0.0313</td>
<td>-0.185**</td>
<td>0.0646</td>
<td>-6.399</td>
<td>-0.0713</td>
<td>-218.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
<td>(1.596)</td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(7.794)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
<td>(0.0408)</td>
<td>(27.93)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(111.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Round 3 dummy</strong></td>
<td>-0.000381</td>
<td>3.707</td>
<td>0.146*</td>
<td>11.67**</td>
<td>0.350**</td>
<td>0.0883</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>-16.95</td>
<td>-0.0372</td>
<td>93.86**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0179)</td>
<td>(2.753)</td>
<td>(0.0807)</td>
<td>(4.363)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.0570)</td>
<td>(0.0238)</td>
<td>(22.25)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(46.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Round 4 dummy</strong></td>
<td>0.000387</td>
<td>-3.823</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>12.22**</td>
<td>0.237*</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
<td>-0.0875**</td>
<td>-8.733</td>
<td>0.0680</td>
<td>138.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
<td>(2.842)</td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
<td>(5.497)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.0624)</td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td>(29.34)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(47.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>5.58e-05</td>
<td>0.0116</td>
<td>0.640***</td>
<td>117.8***</td>
<td>1.383***</td>
<td>0.475***</td>
<td>0.186***</td>
<td>174.3***</td>
<td>0.0135</td>
<td>265.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0128)</td>
<td>(1.716)</td>
<td>(0.0272)</td>
<td>(2.542)</td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0196)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
<td>(17.90)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(28.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>3,191</td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>3,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of households</strong></td>
<td>882</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline mean</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1.370</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>172.8</td>
<td>0.00962</td>
<td>265.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regressions are household fixed-effects analysis weighted to be representative of all cooperative members. The first two columns estimate the effect of the intervention on uptake (acceptance of the free insurance voucher). Remaining columns examine impacts on agricultural and household outcomes. Data include two pre-treatment rounds for some variables and one for others; all variables have two post-treatment observations. Voucher treatment re-randomized at the individual level in rounds 3 and 4. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the village level to account for the design effect.

***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1.
binary outcome for any insurance coverage (which in this case means accepting the free insurance policy) as well as a continuous outcome for the sum insured in that season. We then examine a core set of agricultural outcomes, including all of the farming activity of the household and not only the crops covered by the insurance policy. The primary outcome for the study was fertilizer use, which we study using three variables: a dummy for whether the household used any chemical fertilizer at all during the meher season covered by the insurance (column 3), the number of kilograms of fertilizer used (column 4), and the number of crops on which fertilizer was used (column 5). We then examine other inputs, including a dummy for any improved seeds (column 6), any credit that was specifically taken for input purchases (column 7), and the total value of all inputs used (column 8). Finally, we broaden the lens from inputs to study an index of agricultural yields across all five major study crops (teff, wheat, barley, sorghum, and maize) each crop yield is z-scored by subtracting the mean yield off and dividing by the standard deviation, and we take the average of this z-score across all crops grown by a given household (in column 9), total household income (column 10), and the total area of land cultivated by the household (column 11).

We focus our estimation on the row for “Any Voucher” ($\beta_2$), which generates a very large first-stage effect on uptake of the insurance. Troublingly, none of the three variables describing the use of fertilizer are significantly affected by the provision of insurance vouchers, despite the fact that 39% of the individuals in this group are insured. The use of any chemical fertilizer rises by a mere 3% off a base of 63%, and this effect has a t-statistic below one. The number of kilograms of chemical fertilizer used actually falls by 4.6, or 4% of the baseline mean, and the number of crops on which fertilizer is used sees a similar small decline. Turning to the use of improved seeds we see an apparently impressive increase of 8%, but a more careful examination shows that this is relative to a decline of 18% in treatment villages for individuals who do not receive vouchers (both effects significant at 10% level). Credit use does not increase, and the area cultivated declines slowly over time at the same rate in the treatment and the control. (Note that given an overall uptake rate of ~40%, our estimate of the Treatment on the Treated for receiving a voucher would simply be the ITT estimates presented times ~2.5). As we would expect when inputs to the agricultural process remain unchanged, yields are similar across groups, and household income remains unchanged by the receipt of the free insurance voucher. Additional analysis (not shown) indicates that there was no effect of insurance coverage on farmers’ decisions to plant or dedicate inputs to teff, the specific crop covered by more than 70% of the insurance sold.

Against this discouraging picture of the impact of index insurance vouchers, it is important to highlight the remarkable improvements apparent in the round dummies. The use of chemical fertilizer surges overall during the course of the 2012 (R3) and 2013 (R4) seasons: the fraction of farmers using fertilizers rises from a control average of 64% in 2010–2011 to 79% in 2012 and 75% in 2013. The average number of kilograms used in the control goes from 118 to 130 in 2012 and 2013. So it is important to recognize that lack of insurance impacts is measured during an interval when the target outcomes of the study were strongly improving overall.

Does the lack of impact arise from a lack of statistical power? Clearly the village-level insurance experiment in our reduced sample is underpowered. Examination of the standard errors on the individual-level voucher experiment, however, suggests that power is not a major concern. Multiplying the standard errors on the impact coefficients in the first row by 1.96, we would be able to detect an increase of at least 8% in fertilizer use, and 7.5% in improved seeds or credit. For fertilizer, this represents a standardized effect size of .18, represented as a fraction of the standard deviation of this variable in the baseline control. This is a relatively small standardized minimum detectable effect, indicating that the voucher-level experiment is adequately powered. Further, we see negative coefficients on two of the three variables describing the primary fertilizer outcome, and we clearly have plenty of power to detect the cross-period changes in input use and incomes. Hence, although the final study sample is less well-powered than the original

---

8The outcome “any fertilizer” is measured from an overall question at the household level that asks “Tell me how much of various inputs did you use and buy during the past 12 months and how did you finance them?” The outcomes for the kilograms of fertilizer used and the number of crops on which fertilizer was used come from plot-level survey questions, as is standard in the World Bank’s LSMS agricultural surveys.
design intended, we can conclude that at least the individual-level voucher treatment did not result in any substantial improvement in input use or incomes during the period of the study relative to the absence of a voucher.

**The Impact of the Training Exercise**

We next present an analysis that looks at the impact of the training administered by the survey firm at baseline, as well as how the training may interact with receipt of a voucher. Because this analysis combines an intervention randomized at baseline (training) with one randomized across rounds (vouchers), we examine the first and second sales season separately, using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) specification to absorb the variation explained by the lagged dependent variable. This specification is:

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_{ict} &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 T_{ict} + \gamma_2 V_{ict} + \gamma_3 P_{ict} \\
&\quad + \gamma_4 (V_{ict} \cdot P_{ict}) + \rho Y_{ict-1} + \epsilon_{ict}.
\end{align*}
\]

In this specification, \(P_{ict}\) is a dummy variable for treatment prior to the outcome observation in survey year \(t\), \(\gamma_2\) gives the impact of vouchers in the absence of the training, \(\gamma_3\) gives the effect of training in the absence of a voucher (because there was no adoption of insurance in the study sample in the absence of a voucher, we expect this term not to be significant), and \(\gamma_4\) measures whether the impact of the voucher experiment is different for those trained directly in how the insurance works.

Table 4 presents the results of the ANCOVA analysis, interacting vouchers with trainings for each sales year separately. The first row of this table examines the impact of voucher in the subsample that did not get trained, and the third row the additional impact of vouchers for those who were trained. Beginning with take up, we see that in the first sales season there was a strong interactive effect of the two treatments (the trained are 11% more likely to use vouchers) but that this effect of the training had faded by the second sales season. The bottom row shows the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable; most of our outcomes with the exception of “total value of inputs used” have strong positive autocorrelation. In terms of impacts, in neither sales season and for no combination of treatments do we see any clear pattern of improved agricultural or welfare outcomes. We might have hoped to find that once the insurance was better understood as a result of the training exercise, the receipt of free vouchers would induce a behavioral response among farmers. Unfortunately there is no evidence of this, suggesting that while the training exercise had some commercial logic (increased own purchase of insurance as well as uptake of vouchers), there is no welfare benefit induced by the combination of training and vouchers.

**The Dynamic Effect of Subsidies**

The preceding subsection illustrated that demand for the product was vanishingly small in the absence of subsidies but that vouchers for insurance created strong variation in the rate at which individuals were successfully issued insurance policies by Nyala. Given the now well-recognized problems of demand in launching a new index insurance product, however, a business case for subsidies can still be made if they have strong enough effects on subsequent demand, and positive dynamic effects of subsidies have been suggested in the context of learning about the new probability distribution of farmer income (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2016). Our study provides a very simple environment in which to pose this question, because we independently randomized subsidies in the first and second sales seasons (measured using survey waves 3 and 4, respectively), meaning that we can examine the impact of first-season subsidies \(T_{ic1}\) and second-season subsidies \(T_{ic2}\) for individual \(i\) in cluster \(c\) on second-season demand \(D_{ic2}\), using the cross-sectional regression

\[
D_{ic2} = \beta_0 + \delta_1 T_{ic1} + \delta_2 T_{ic2} + \epsilon_{ic2}.
\]

Standard errors in this regression are clustered at the village level to reflect the design effect. This regression, as all of the main regressions in the paper, is estimated using only the sample of cooperative members. This first pass at this question is provided in column 1 of table 5, which analyzes the impact of subsidies in the first and second year on the uptake of insurance in the second year. The first clear result from this table is that the vouchers have strong contemporaneous effects on the probability that an individual is protected by insurance; uptake is elevated by 36% in the presence of subsidies, and the sum insured is driven strongly by the amount of the voucher in that season. The dynamic subsidy argument requires that subsidies create more permanent demand, however,
Table 4. ANCOVA Impacts of Vouchers and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First sales season</th>
<th>Covered by insurance (1)</th>
<th>Any chemical fertilizer (2)</th>
<th>KGs of chemical fertilizer (3)</th>
<th>Number of crops using chemical fertilizer (4)</th>
<th>Uses any improved seeds (5)</th>
<th>Uses any input credit (6)</th>
<th>Total value of inputs used (7)</th>
<th>Index of agricultural yields (8)</th>
<th>HH income per capita (9)</th>
<th>Area cultivated (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voucher provided in corresponding season</td>
<td>0.280*** (0.0689)</td>
<td>−0.0422 (0.0536)</td>
<td>−37.55* (21.20)</td>
<td>−0.252 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.0423 (0.0963)</td>
<td>0.0459 (0.0785)</td>
<td>−31.68 (28.95)</td>
<td>−0.0745 (0.0737)</td>
<td>18.79 (49.99)</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA-provided training at baseline (1.26e-08)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00917 (0.0772)</td>
<td>−34.47 (20.64)</td>
<td>−0.0946 (0.211)</td>
<td>−0.0146 (0.122)</td>
<td>0.0960 (0.107)</td>
<td>−17.23 (30.14)</td>
<td>0.0351 (0.107)</td>
<td>120.9 (106.2)</td>
<td>0.1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Voucher and *Training</td>
<td>0.110** (0.0448)</td>
<td>−0.0137 (0.0833)</td>
<td>41.95 (26.25)</td>
<td>0.151 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.0347 (0.119)</td>
<td>−0.00244 (0.121)</td>
<td>30.60 (45.83)</td>
<td>0.0161 (0.146)</td>
<td>−175.3 (122.1)</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Outcome</td>
<td>0.348*** (0.0673)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.0342)</td>
<td>0.643*** (0.0522)</td>
<td>0.513*** (0.0532)</td>
<td>0.306*** (0.0628)</td>
<td>0.0254 (0.0279)</td>
<td>0.177*** (0.0598)</td>
<td>0.324*** (0.00658)</td>
<td>−0.000210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>848</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Control group mean</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1.370</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>172.8</td>
<td>0.00962</td>
<td>265.3</td>
<td>2.108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second sales season</th>
<th>Covered by insurance (1)</th>
<th>Any chemical fertilizer (2)</th>
<th>KGs of chemical fertilizer (3)</th>
<th>Number of crops using chemical fertilizer (4)</th>
<th>Uses any improved seeds (5)</th>
<th>Uses any input credit (6)</th>
<th>Total value of inputs used (7)</th>
<th>Index of agricultural yields (8)</th>
<th>HH income per capita (9)</th>
<th>Area cultivated (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voucher provided in corresponding season</td>
<td>0.420*** (0.0635)</td>
<td>0.0332 (0.0793)</td>
<td>15.82 (19.76)</td>
<td>−0.0477 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.0771)</td>
<td>−0.0151 (0.0755)</td>
<td>−50.35* (26.93)</td>
<td>−0.0277 (0.0719)</td>
<td>7.212 (44.21)</td>
<td>−0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA-provided training at baseline (5.73e-09)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0327 (0.0513)</td>
<td>12.73 (24.89)</td>
<td>0.0436 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.0506 (0.0563)</td>
<td>−0.0214 (0.0649)</td>
<td>−13.28 (33.62)</td>
<td>0.0909 (0.0688)</td>
<td>−51.20 (40.49)</td>
<td>0.00527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Voucher *and training</td>
<td>−0.0925 (0.0669)</td>
<td>0.0427 (0.0789)</td>
<td>−29.76 (25.81)</td>
<td>0.0852 (0.184)</td>
<td>−0.160** (0.0747)</td>
<td>0.0110 (0.0724)</td>
<td>29.74 (31.22)</td>
<td>0.0129 (0.0785)</td>
<td>106.7 (69.58)</td>
<td>−0.0251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline outcome</td>
<td>0.404*** (0.0679)</td>
<td>0.789*** (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.646*** (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.407*** (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.196*** (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.0370 (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.111** (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.446*** (0.00986)</td>
<td>0.000986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continues)
and when we look at the effect of season 1 vouchers, we find no evidence that the effect has persisted into season 2. The point estimate on this term is very small (3.8 pp) and far from significant. Column 2 shows that the amount of the voucher has no effect on uptake either concurrently or subsequently. The impact of the voucher amount on the sum insured displays a similar pattern: strong contemporaneous effects but no detectable dynamic effect at all.

One mechanism through which the literature has suggested sales can be built is that insurance becomes credible once agents see payouts being made (Cole, Stein, and Tobacman 2014; Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2016). To test this, we define a dummy variable $W_{ic1}$ based on the rainfall realizations at the local rainfall station and the main crops that a farmer grows to indicate that they would have received a payout in the first sales season had they decided to purchase insurance (the variable is constructed in the same way for the treatment and control). We then interact this variable with the (randomized) season 1 vouchers.

\[
D_{ic2} = \beta_0 + \delta_1 T_{ic1} + \delta_2 T_{ic2} + \eta_1 W_{ic1} + \eta_2 (T_{ic1} * W_{ic1}) + \epsilon_{ic2}
\]

The uninteracted term therefore tests whether having payouts made in your village for your crop to others around you induces subsequent demand, and the interaction term tests whether this effect is bigger for those who received vouchers, roughly 40% of whom actually received insurance payments. Column 3 shows that neither of these terms is significant, indicating that neither the presence of historical payouts nor the receipt of subsidies in combination with payouts leads to increases in demand. Columns 5–8 show similar results on the sum insured; although this outcome responds more strongly to the contemporaneous voucher amount, there is still no impact of lagged voucher receipts. As a final test we calculate the payout amount that an individual would have received based on location, baseline crop, and voucher amount, and in columns (4) and (8) examine whether this local payout rate drives future sales; again, it does not. Consequently, this relatively well-powered demand experiment provides no evidence that temporary subsidies resulted in a durable improvement in demand for index insurance.
### Table 5. Dynamic Effects of Subsidies On Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uptake of insurance in year 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Sum insured year 2</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any voucher year 1</td>
<td>0.0385</td>
<td>0.0433</td>
<td>0.0439</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
<td>55.04</td>
<td>66.02</td>
<td>44.55</td>
<td>45.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0446)</td>
<td>(0.0572)</td>
<td>(0.0647)</td>
<td>(0.0567)</td>
<td>(50.95)</td>
<td>(83.68)</td>
<td>(88.93)</td>
<td>(83.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher amount year 1</td>
<td>-0.000203</td>
<td>-0.000145</td>
<td>-0.000385</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.538</td>
<td>-1.365</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00220)</td>
<td>(0.00218)</td>
<td>(0.00219)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.431)</td>
<td>(3.381)</td>
<td>(3.437)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any voucher year 2</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>0.378***</td>
<td>0.371***</td>
<td>0.373***</td>
<td>422.3***</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>131.7</td>
<td>121.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0548)</td>
<td>(0.0957)</td>
<td>(0.0979)</td>
<td>(0.0984)</td>
<td>(91.09)</td>
<td>(104.8)</td>
<td>(102.4)</td>
<td>(99.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher amount year 2</td>
<td>-0.00126</td>
<td>-0.00111</td>
<td>-0.00115</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.32**</td>
<td>19.69**</td>
<td>19.83**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00593)</td>
<td>(0.00591)</td>
<td>(0.00592)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(7.909)</td>
<td>(7.931)</td>
<td>(7.894)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel village treatment dummy</td>
<td>-0.0313</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
<td>-0.0436</td>
<td>-0.0378</td>
<td>-44.74</td>
<td>-30.57</td>
<td>-46.66</td>
<td>-54.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0363)</td>
<td>(0.0357)</td>
<td>(0.0423)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(41.91)</td>
<td>(42.08)</td>
<td>(47.53)</td>
<td>(39.99)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurance would have paid out Y1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0723</td>
<td>0.0385</td>
<td></td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>183.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0879)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(127.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher Y1 * Insurance would pay Y1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0881)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(105.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance payout if Y1 voucher was used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.51e-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.261</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.59e-05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0***</td>
<td>0***</td>
<td>-0.00368</td>
<td>-0.00196</td>
<td>0***</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>-6.077</td>
<td>-9.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0.00500)</td>
<td>(0.00377)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(7.450)</td>
<td>(10.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regressions present pooled OLS analysis, weighted to be representative of cooperative members in study villages; dependent variable is the insurance purchase decision observed using institutional data from the insurer in the second sales season. “Insurance would have paid out” is based on location and crop grown + actual payout rates per crop and rainfall station. “Insurance payout if Y1 voucher was used” is the amount the payout would have been given main crop if the sum insured were driven only by the randomized voucher amount in the previous season. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the village level to account for the design effect.

***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1.
Unpacking the Lack of Impact

We now seek to understand why our study delivered not only low demand for commercial insurance but also such small impacts on agricultural outcomes even when insurance was provided for free. We consider four explanations in turn.

Impacts of the Sum Insured, Using Voucher Amounts as an Instrument

A first possibility is that many of the vouchers we distributed were simply too small to affect behavior. To investigate this, we pursue two approaches. The first of these is to exploit the fact that the randomly assigned voucher amounts generate very strong experimental variation in the sum insured. Online supplementary appendix, figure A3 illustrates this relationship, showing the almost perfectly linear relationship between the voucher amount and the sum insured, and illustrating that at the highest voucher amounts the sum insured is nearly $80, representing 55% of the total value of inputs observed in the control group, which is equal to $147. We can use this to estimate a slope effect that is sensitive to the sum insured, instrumenting for the (endogenous) sum insured with the randomly assigned voucher amounts. This analysis is presented in the online supplementary appendix, table A7. Panel A of table A7 column 1 shows the first stage of the IV regression, indicating that the instrument has a $t$-statistic of 4, and the IV regression should be well powered to detect impacts. Columns 2–9 present these instrumented impacts on the battery of primary outcomes, illustrating that even when we translate impacts into the marginal effect of the sum insured, we are unable to detect any significant changes in inputs or agricultural productivity as a result of the insurance.

A second way of tackling this question is to isolate the impact of receiving the largest voucher amounts. We do this by defining a separate dummy variable that indicates being treated with the largest voucher amounts, which we characterize as the vouchers for 300, 400, and 500 Ethiopian birr ($20.83, $27.78, and $34.72). Panel B of the online supplementary appendix table A7 includes separate dummies for the large transfer amounts and the smaller transfer amounts, and at the bottom of the table we present an $F$-test of the difference between the two impacts. As in panel A, there is no indication that the study provided any transfers that generate significant impacts; neither of the two voucher dummies is significant and nor is the difference between them, for any of the primary outcomes in the study. Although we cannot, of course, speak to the impacts that would have been observed had we distributed larger vouchers, we find no indication that even the largest subsidies in our study had any meaningful impact on investment behavior. This is suggestive that the overall lack of impacts is not arising simply from small average subsidies.

Differential Impacts by Risk Rationing Status

A second explanation for low uptake and small impacts would be that only a small share of the farmers in our sample were constrained in their input investment behavior by the presence of risk. In this case, potentially large impacts in the risk-constrained group could be swamped in the intention to treat analysis by the small numbers of such individuals. This suggests a heterogeneity analysis where we distinguish the analysis of uptake and impacts by whether individuals were risk constrained at baseline. This is a subgroup analysis that we anticipated in our earliest project documents, and we carefully classified the credit rationing status of households at baseline using the approach outlined in Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger (2008). Standard agricultural investment models such as Bardhan and Udry (1999), Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger (2008), and Carter, Cheng, and Sarris (2016) would all predict that the first-order impacts of insurance on expanding the willingness to borrow and invest in inputs will be strongest in the risk-constrained group. We use a set of survey questions on the access to and use of input credit to classify farmers into four constraint categories: unconstrained (currently using credit), quantity rationed (could get loan but find it too expensive), and risk rationed (could get loan and would be able to cover interest costs on average but unwilling to bear the risk of possible default). Overall, we classify 54.6% of our sample as unconstrained, 18.8% as quantity constrained, 6.8% as price constrained, and 19.8% as risk constrained.

Online supplementary appendix, table A8 shows the results of this interaction analysis. In order to present the raw effects of the credit rationing status of the household, we run this regression as a difference in difference (DID) without household-level fixed effects. As in
previous tables, Columns 1 and 2 show the uptake variables (dummy for purchased insurance and the sum insured), and in neither case does credit rationing status drive uptake, either in absolute terms or in interaction with the receipt of a voucher. When we look at the study outcomes in Columns 3–10, we see that those who were classified as credit rationed at baseline have sharply lower input investment overall: they are 9% less likely to use any fertilizer than the unconstrained, they use 42 Kgs less fertilizer and use it on roughly a third the number of crops, and total input expenditures among the risk constrained are only about 2/3rds of those of the unconstrained. Despite these large cross-sectional differences, there are no signs of significant differential impacts of the provision of vouchers on the risk constrained. Hence, we uncover no evidence that the lack of demand and impact in our sample is masking large impacts among the subset of individuals whose input investment decisions are most constrained by the presence of risk.

**Comprehension and Trust of the Index Insurance Product**

In the round 4 endline, we conducted a survey in treatment villages that asked household heads to describe what they knew of the Nyala index insurance product, how they had learned about it, and what their experiences with the product had been. In terms of awareness of the product and understanding of the voucher distribution, farmers appear to have been properly sensitized. 88.3% of surveyed cooperative members in treatment villages reported having received information about the insurance, although Nyala’s strategy of indirect marketing can be clearly seen in their sources of information: 81% reported EEA9 (the survey entity) as their primary source of information about the product, 8.3% the cooperative leadership, and only 5.4% reported getting information directly from a Nyala representative.10 A promotional brochure that was developed by Nyala and distributed by EEA had been seen by 56% of households, and 73% of households reported understanding the product “very well” (9%) or “partially” (64%). Recall of the voucher amounts that had been distributed was excellent; of the 370 cooperative members randomly assigned to receive vouchers in the second sales season, only 6 incorrectly recalled their voucher amounts. So overall the promotional materials for the insurance and the voucher subsidies were distributed on the ground in a manner that closely conformed to the research design, and awareness of the product was high.

When we dig into the details of the product, however, and the extent of trust that farmers felt in the index and the company, the picture is less rosy. When asked the factual question as to the event that would trigger a payout, only 6.4% of respondents correctly indicated deficit rainfall at the closest rainfall monitoring station. Although 23% indicated that they simply did not know, the most common answer (44%) was that payouts would be triggered by crop losses on the respondent’s farm. This indicates that the plurality of cooperative farmers in fact believed that they were being offered indemnity insurance. This certainly points to major potential problems for the insurer in the event of uncovered losses, but it cannot serve as an explanation for low demand or meager impacts because it suggests that farmers believed the product to be closer to a form of perfect insurance than was in fact the case, and they were not being dissuaded by the presence of basis risk. Despite this confusion about the index structure, the twenty farmers who reported having purchased insurance and faced an insurable loss all reported having been contacted by Nyala to arrange the payout, and seventeen of them had actually received the money by the time of the R4 survey. Thus, it does not appear that disagreements over payouts among the insured, or any actual failure to honor the contact by Nyala, were to blame. Nonetheless, by the time of the endline survey, households that received the promotion are no more knowledgeable about the insurance product than households in the same village who had not received the promotion.

Overall, it appears that there were meaningful holes in understanding of the product. A relatively cost-effective promotion of the product led to a substantial increase in both acceptance of the vouchers and out-of-pocket expenses, but demand among those who received the promotion faded over time, and they did not understand the product better by endline. We conclude that distrust and misunderstanding were prevalent causes of low demand but that

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9EEA is the Ethiopian Economic Association, which functions as a research organization.

10The remainder reported other sources such as village officials, friends and relatives, and so on.
at least in the short term demand can be improved with a more intensive client education and promotion plan.

State-Led Agriculture and Rigidity in the Input Provision Process

The heavy state role in the agricultural sector could inhibit demand for a market priced product, particularly given the importance and visibility of the government’s massive safety net program (PSNP) in the study area (Duru 2016). Even when free insurance is provided, as was done with our vouchers, the rigidities of the Ethiopian input provision process may inhibit the input usage response at the farmer level. The long planning times involved in the input procurement process, the egalitarian ethos of the cooperatives, and the lack of outside options for purchasing may all limit the ability of individual farmers to adapt their input usage decisions easily. Preliminary evidence that this is the case is provided by the fact that the intracluster correlation on the use of chemical fertilizer within the control group across all four rounds is .66, indicating that only one third of the variation in the key input for this study is found within village.

A simple way of understanding whether the cooperative supply chain generates an inflexible input response is to incorporate into our analysis the two non-cooperative households that were included in both the survey and the voucher treatment in each village. In the online supplementary appendix, table A9 we conduct analysis of heterogeneity using pooled OLS, including a dummy for the non-co-op members, the panel voucher treatment dummy, and the interaction between these two terms. This interaction asks whether a disproportionate response to the treatment is visible in the non-co-op members, as might be the case if they had differential access to more flexible sources of inputs or input financing and hence were able to respond more fully to being insured. The results clearly indicate that non-members have significantly lower use of chemical fertilizer overall, and despite relatively low power, there is no evidence of a disproportionate response to the treatment among the non-cooperative members. Indeed, most of the point estimates are negative, suggesting that if anything those farmers with access to the cooperative supply chain are in fact more responsive to the treatment.11

Finally, we can examine whether the baseline presence of PSNP in the village or receipt of PSNP at the household level has depressed demand for private insurance. By good luck our sample is relatively well stratified by PSNP access (40% of panel study villages were eligible for PSNP, and within these villages 31% of study households were direct beneficiaries at baseline). This analysis (presented in the online supplementary appendix, table A10, panel A) shows that among cooperative members there is no evidence that PSNP depresses uptake of the vouchers; if anything the point estimates are positive and of moderate magnitude, in the range of 5–7% points.12 In panel B we show the differential impacts of having vouchers for those who also are covered by PSNP. In row 3 of this table we see the outstanding household-level poverty targeting of PSNP: eligible households are less likely to use every kind of measured input at the 99% level and have agricultural yields that are just under .2 SD lower than the ineligible. Despite the huge disparity between the eligible and ineligible groups overall, however, there is no solid evidence of differential impacts of insurance vouchers. Although the PSNP eligible group do increase “any use” of fertilizer when given vouchers relative to the voucher-treated ineligibles (significant at 95%), the value of fertilizers used is actually somewhat lower, and use of credit is significantly lower. Total value of inputs used, yields, and household income all see insignificant differential impacts. Therefore PSNP coverage drives neither uptake nor impacts of formal insurance.

So, although it is certainly possible that the marginal effects of free insurance on input use would have been stronger in a more demand-driven market environment, we do not find evidence that the cooperative structure, supply chain rigidity, or public safety nets

11If the question of rigidity was a driving one, we might also expect that farmers would have a strong preference to receive credit and insurance earlier in the season, because this would give them more time to adjust input usage. When we look in the data we do not see responses consistent with this; only 3.4% of respondents say that they would have been more interested in the interlinked product if it could deliver credit in a more timely way. Only 9% of respondents say that the timeliness of the insurance offer was the major issue.

12This results stands in contrast to Duru (2016), who using the same survey find a depressive effect of PSNP. That analysis includes non-cooperative members and weights the whole sample to be representative of study villages, meaning that the two such individuals sampled in each village have a strong effect on the results.
in the Ethiopian environment are directly responsible for the weak connection between being insured and farmer-level outcomes. Overall, the most compelling argument we find for the lack of impact of the product on farmer behavior seems to be the indirect relationship of the insurer to the farmers and the imperfect informational environment that existed on the ground. In the conclusion we discuss the implication of these results for the design of programs that seek to provide subsidized risk protection to farmers.

Descriptive Analysis of the Impact of the Interlinked Product

An additional contribution of the EPIICA project was the emphasis on interlinking WII with a credit product, thereby creating a contingent loan for risk-exposed farmers. We conclude our analysis by providing a brief description of our experiences in this endeavor. Under our design, village-level cooperatives would aggregate demand for the interlinked loans, pass it on to the unions, who would in turn sign a single loan contract with Dashen Bank for all their sub-cooperatives, collateralized by the productive assets of the union. This solution represented a potentially fundamental reshaping of the way in which agricultural risk was apportioned in the credit system, and many parties were eager to see this happen.

In the end, however, fielding the interlinking proved to be a substantial logistical challenge. The current public credit system makes state governments explicitly liable for the agricultural lending portfolio, permitting the use of extension agents, police, and other officials in the debt collection process. Recognizing the exposure it faced as a private-sector entity newly entering a market previously so dominated by the state, Dashen insisted that the cooperative unions (CUs) have a stake in the successful recovery of loans through the interlinked product via collateralizing the loans with CU assets. Unions are cooperatively managed entities with a somewhat ambiguous legal status, and this requirement to use their own assets to leverage credit for members was new and difficult to negotiate. This tension suggests a fundamental issue in the process of interlinking: despite the fact that the index insurance product itself generates little moral hazard, an interlinked loan may still have substantial non-weather-related residual moral hazard. This makes decisions about where this risk sits very consequential. Given the design of our financial product, the collateralization of the assets of the quasi-public unions turned out to be the place where this non-weather-driven risk became concentrated and consequently proved one of the most difficult steps to negotiate.

All five cooperative unions in the project implementation area attended workshops intended to facilitate the understanding and development of the interlinked product, as well as providing financial documents to Dashen that let the bank begin to assess their creditworthiness and begin the contracting mechanism. Only one union (Merkeb) was ultimately able to clear the various hurdles required to receive loans from Dashen, and they ended up providing interlinked loans to a single village, Feres Wega (FW). Credit did not reach the farmers in this village until after the fourth and final round of the full household survey. We did nonetheless design a special survey instrument that was fielded in FW in a fifth round (in early 2016), including all twenty of the panel individuals who we had previously been tracking and hundred additional randomly sampled households among those who took up the interlinked product. The product was sold in late 2014, and we conducted this fifth survey in early 2016. In that year (2014) the interlinked product was offered to all farmers in the stated village, not only to those in the panel. In total, 254 farmers obtained interlinked insurance and credit through the project in that year.

Of the twenty households in the panel from FW, fifteen had received at some point a voucher towards the premium, and eleven bought interlinked insurance for an uptake rate of 55%. Of those in the panel who received a voucher but did not buy any insurance, the majority (four out of six) indicated lack of understanding of the product as the major reason they did not buy. The other hundred surveyed households were outside the original study sample and did not receive any voucher. Of the 120 farmers surveyed,

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13The largest parastatal lender in the study credit system at present is the Amhara Credit and Savings Institution (ACSI); some of the means applied by ACSI to compel repayment has led to discontent among the customers.
107 indicated that they received information about the insurance product offered by Nyala. And 94 (out of 105 respondents) indicated that they understood the product well or partially. A very high share (108 out of 120) of farmers among the respondents applied for the Dashen loan covered by weather index insurance. Of the 108 who applied for the loan, 105 received the full amount for which they applied, whereas the other 3 stated that they received less than that which they applied. The average amount of loan applied for was 1675 birr, with 75% of the applicants asking 1400 birr and only four applicants asking for 3000 or more birr. Of the 108 farmers who received the loan, 45 knew that the insurance premium was included in the price of the loan. All 108 applicants applied via the local cooperatives, and 105 out of the 108 felt that the system of getting bank loans through the cooperatives was appropriate.

We have no counterfactual for the changes measured in round 5 in Feres Wega, both because this cooperative is clearly endogenously selected in a number of dimensions and because we did not conduct panel surveys in other villages in this round. We nonetheless conduct an exploratory analysis as to the possible effects of linked insurance and credit on input use by simply asking respondents in this village about the changes in their farming behavior that occurred after they received an interlinked loan. Online supplementary appendix, table A11 shows that among those who applied for an interlinked loan, the number reporting increases in chemical fertilizer use (72) far outweigh the numbers who indicated no change (27) or a decline (9). In all input categories the number of those who declared that they increased the use of the relevant input is larger than the number of those indicating a decrease. So although successfully fielding the interlinked product in only one of the intended forty villages underlines the hurdles to implementing these contracts, a surge in input use in FW is consistent with the idea that where we can manage to relax credit and risk constraints simultaneously, input use and productivity will rise.

Conclusion

Insurance, like credit, is a product that is inherently time inconsistent in the absence of some mechanism to enforce adherence to the contract. The fundamental difference is that credit is time inconsistent for the client, whereas with insurance it is the firm who wishes to renege. This means that the dynamic credibility of the insurer is a critical precondition for the emergence of market demand. Although Ethiopia is known across the world for the severity of its droughts and the huge toll they can take on peasant farmers, it is also an environment in which the public sector plays a central role (particularly in the cooperative sector studied here). Private-sector actors in the country face an ambiguous legal environment without clear property rights or enforcement of contracts. Thus the context of this study provides a very strong environment in which to test for the impacts of reducing weather risk but also potentially an uphill climb for private-sector insurance provision.

The effort to shift risk away from smallholder farmers and toward the international reinsurance system is one that appears to present large welfare benefits, but to achieve it through index insurance one must generate wide-scale adoption. Our study illustrates several discouraging points as to the promise of the private sector to deliver this in the Ethiopian context. First, it is clear that this standalone weather index insurance product as promoted and marketed elicited little market demand, and even an individually targeted promotion conducted at the household level by our survey firm led to little long-term willingness to pay. Improvements in indexes to reduce basis risk such as the “double trigger” strategy of Stoeffler et al. (2016) are likely be an important part of boosting demand. Nonetheless, if a sustainable private market is to be achieved, good marketing and promotion will be central.

In our study, subsidies providing small free “tester” insurance policies, generated a willingness to accept the contract but no subsequent improvement in private demand in subsequent seasons even if that insurance policy paid out in the first year. Thus, we find no support for the idea of subsidizing to build the market. Finally, we show that this free insurance did not result in meaningful increases in input investment, suggesting that the productivity argument for subsidies is also absent. Hence, marketing and subsidizing micro-insurance policies all the way down to the level of individual farmers did not relax risk constraints enough to unlock first-order increases in productivity. More positively, our results show hope that a properly
developed and marketed interlinked product could meet with demand. In the cooperative where all of the steps in the chain were forged to provide interlinked insurance to farmers, uptake was strong and more than a hundred farmers were able to access interlinked, private-sector credit.

What is the takeaway message from this study? It is certainly not that risk is unimportant in agriculture; our survey data are full of evidence that this is not the case. A large share of surveyed farmers report risk as the main impediment to purchasing more inputs. That individually marketed index insurance is not a viable commercial product is now relatively well-established. Where our results provide particular caution, however is in illustrating that in a context with indirect marketing and promotion of the insurance to farmers, even free risk protection does not trigger an agricultural response. Many of the studies that have shown production effects from subsidized risk protection have done so in the context of large-scale and well-known national programs, such as those in India (Cole, Giné, and Vickery 2017), or China (Cai 2016), or using intensive multi-visit marketing of the insurance at the household level (Karlan et al. 2014). One can therefore interpret our results as being evidence of the fact that the construction of the infrastructure that credibly delivers an insurance-driven productivity surge among rural farmers via individually marketed insurance is a heavy lift. Our product was both new and imperfectly understood, and in this context the hoped-for input response to risk protection did not materialize. This suggests that success in driving agricultural productivity through ex ante risk protection will need to happen in the context of a substantial effort to build familiarity and credibility. Otherwise the production-side benefits of ex ante risk protection are not realized, in which case effective ex post risk protection to smallholders can likely be more cost effectively provided by meso-level actors. Particular attention should be paid to innovations that sit at the nexus of credit and risk markets.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material are available at American Journal of Agricultural Economics online.

References


Cai, Jing, Alain De Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. 2015. Social Networks and...


